Discuss one or more theories of Moral Understanding and evaluate its conclusions

The term ethical quality, as indicated by Shaffer (1993) implies â€Å"a set of standards or goals that help the person to separate right from wrong and to follow up on this differentiation. Profound quality is imperative to society, as it would not work viably except if there is some understanding of what is good and bad. There are numerous hidden procedures and ecological components, which restrict or advance social, subjective and moral improvement in youngsters. In current society, TV could be viewed as one of the significant effects on a child’s moral turn of events. There are three ways to deal with moral turn of events; the psychological methodology, the psychodynamic approach and the social learning hypothesis. The Cognitive-Developmental methodology of Piaget and Kohlberg concentrates how kids become progressively ready to reason ethically and make moral decisions, while the Freud’s psychodynamic approach is increasingly worried about the advancement of the inner voice and good emotions, for example, blame and nervousness. The social learning hypothesis of Bandura and Mischel researches the improvement of good conduct and how good examples in the family, society and the media, impact it. The hypothesis I will examine is Piaget’s Cognitive-Developmental Approach. His hypothesis of good advancement is worried about how the child’s moral information and understanding change with age. Piaget considered ethical quality to be any arrangement of rules, which oversees cooperation between individuals. The techniques for examination he used to build up his hypotheses were, he taken a gander at the manner in which kids forced guidelines in their games. He utilized games to contemplate the advancement of children’s moral improvement as he felt that by considering rules with regards to a game, he could examine the child’s unconstrained however legitimately. He likewise, evaluated changes in the child’s moral decisions by recounting to speculative tales about youngsters who lied, took or broke something. When utilizing speculative stories, Piaget was commonly progressively intrigued by the reasons why the youngsters offer the responses they did a nd not especially the appropriate responses. Piaget distinguishes phases of good improvement similarly as he recognized stages with subjective turn of events. His speculations of the manner in which kids think and their ethical thinking experiences a progression of stages, as they are adjusting to the world, these are otherwise called the procedures of convenience and absorption. He accepted that as children’s thinking about the world changes when they become more seasoned and addition more experience, so does their thinking about ethical quality. Their capacity to consider the world in progressively complex manners is the thing that makes them proceed onward starting with one phase then onto the next. This is known as psychological turn of events. Piaget expressed that babies don’t see much about ethical quality until they are around three or four years old. Their advancement isolates into two fundamental stages after early stages. His phases of good advancement are: Pre Moral Stage (up to three or four years) Kids don’t comprehend about standards, thus they don’t make moral decisions Phase of Heteronomous Morality (matured three †six years) Youngsters at this stage think rules are total and unchangeable, and the integrity and disagreeableness of an activity is judged to a great extent based on its outcomes instead of by considering. Phase of Autonomous Morality (from around six or seven) Kids at this stage presently consider rules to be increasingly variable and goals are considered. Kids likewise begin to accept that it is conceivable to disrupt norms and pull off it, though prior they would in general figure they will consistently be discovered and perhaps rebuffed. Specialists from Europe and America have tried some of Piaget’s hypotheses and have presumed that unmistakable phases of advancement do appear to exist in any case, other examination found that youngsters don't consider all to be as being similarly significant as Piaget suspected they did. Heteronomous Morality, otherwise called moral authenticity, implies when the youngster is liable to another’s laws or rules. Youngsters imagine that rules must be complied with regardless of what the conditions. A kid at this stage will believe that rules are just made by power figures, for example, guardians and instructors. Two different highlights that are shown in moral thinking at this stage are, first they anticipate that terrible conduct should be rebuffed somehow or another, they accept that the discipline ought to be expiatory †the miscreant must present appropriate reparations in light of the wrongdoing by paying with an affliction. They have the view that the measure of discipline should coordinate the disagreeableness of the conduct. Furthermore, in the event that the terrible conduct goes undetected, at that point the kid puts stock in natural equity †where any hardship happening after the awful conduct can be viewed as a discipline. For instance, in the event that a youngster lies and pulls off it, afterwards outings and falls, the more youthful kid could think about this as a discipline. By and large, they accept discipline ought to be reasonable and that bad behavior will consistently be rebuffed here and there. Self-governing Morality, which implies when the kid is dependent upon one’s own laws and rules. It includes moral relativism whereby the youngster comes to understand that rules develop from social connections. Because of the youngster ‘decentring’ and their created capacity to contemplate moral issues, they have started to acknowledge it is essential to consider different people’s assessments. At this stage a kid will have built up the understanding that occasionally rules of profound quality can be broken in certain sensible conditions. They put stock in proportional discipline, whereby the discipline should fit the wrongdoing. For instance, if a youngster takes another child’s desserts, the principal kid ought to be denied of their desserts or should make it up to the casualty in some other manner. This is known as the standard of correspondence. Kids will likewise have learnt at this phase transgressors frequently keep away from discipline, lessening any faith in innate equity. They consider discipline to be a strategy for causing the guilty party to comprehend the idea of the wrongdoing and that discipline is additionally a hindrance. The move from heteronomous profound quality to self-ruling ethical quality is affected by two components. Youngsters around the age of seven start to proceed onward from the pre operational phase of an unreasonable and an egocentric perspective to progressively legitimate and adaptable perspective, in the operational stage. Their developing mindfulness that others have various perspectives permits them to grow increasingly develop moral thinking. Be that as it may, moral improvement slacks at any rate one to two years behind psychological advancement in light of the fact that the entire procedure relies upon the subjective changes happening first. Kohlberg extended Piaget's hypothesis to frame a hypothesis that likewise clarified the advancement of good thinking. While Piaget depicted a two-phase procedure of good turn of events, Kohlberg’s hypothesis sketched out six phases inside three unique levels. Kohlberg expanded Piaget’s hypothesis, recommending that ethical advancement is a constant procedure that happens all through the life expectancy. An examination by Colby et al (1983) condemned Piaget’s supposition that offspring of ten and eleven years of age had arrived at a grown-up level of good thinking. Piaget was continually concentrating on what a normal youngster was fit for accomplishing so he ignored the possibility of incredible varieties between the individual child’s perspectives. By and large, Piaget’s intellectual hypothesis has been scrutinized for the techniques for examination not being as exact as they could have been. Techniques he utilized were viewed as confounded, driving pundits to think he under assessed more youthful children’s abilities of what they could and couldn't do. This was on the grounds that later examination proceeded to infer that kids could really think about different intentions, when they comprehended what thought processes were included. In spite of analysis, Piaget’s work is still viewed as a progressive advance forward in the manner we see how kids think. It has prompted a significantly more practical methods of comprehension children’s moral turn of events. Numerous endeavors to test Piaget’s hypotheses from scientists around the globe have brought about acknowledgment that a portion of his perspectives and techniques do seem to exist.

BUSINESS STRATEGY Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

BUSINESS STRATEGY - Essay Example Methodology is the other term for business wanting to acquire upper hand in the market and to investigate the future occasions to work effectively in vulnerability. The business procedures of an association target bringing out vital choices about the selection of items, client needs, and new open doors in the terms of market and innovation and other significant choices which help the firm to increase an upper hand in the market. The business houses can't take suitable and significant choices without the accessibility of the total data of the outside condition. Business associations can't run in vacuum and it needs to include the outside condition. There are many related gatherings to the professional the clients, society, condition, workers, loan bosses and so on. It is significant for the firm to have a total information about its interior and outer conditions. An intensive investigation of the interior and outer procedures of the association causes it to comprehend its qualities by setting up the focuses or the regions where the association is acceptable at just as understanding its shortcomings, the zones where further improvement is required. This examination would additionally help in understanding the outside conditions to comprehend the extent of the association later on. The vital arranging and proposal requires the careful comprehension of the interior situations of the association in order to plot the procedures likewise, for the boost of the advantages drawn from the systems. The partners of an association have a significant impact in the strategy development and usage of the methodologies.

Investigation of Consumer's Perceptions of Baranka Cafe on Motorway Literature review

Examination of Consumer's Perceptions of Baranka Cafe on Motorway - Literature audit Example Mick, Pettigrew, Pechmann and Ozanne (2011, p.167) note that a brand picture is aggregated reflections about an organization’s characters. It is essential for featuring an organization’s missions and dreams. The components of a productive brand incorporate an affecting logo that ascents to prop an organization’s picture. Furthermore, Rao (2011, p. 49) contends that a motto is basic in portraying an association to sum things up just as supporting the fundamental beliefs of the equivalent. Purchasers use subtleties, in their inner mind, so as to build up an enduring impression about administrations. Thus, they become emotional relationship of the heap of administrations that clients would get in Baranka. A case of brand picture, for Baranka, would worry with cleanliness. Furthermore, the bistro could be recognizable as a refined assistance gathering. The thought behind this intrigue relates to the way that a purchaser buys both an item and a brand. As a rule, a cus tomer’s drive towards administrations would be driven by the brand. Mooji (2009, p 275) features of brand situating proclamation as fundamental in a brand picture. Kapferer (2008, p. 98) affirms that the brand situating articulation interfaces the interior with the outside parts of a brand. These two viewpoints are the important regions of a brand. The inward perspectives identify with a similar that an organization infuses for the market. As far as Baranka, this would allude to the endeavors that they would submit in setting up their particular picture upon clients. As per Prideaux, Moscardo and Laws (2006, p. 54), a brand picture involves the objectives, of brand character and qualities, that the organization expects upon the impression of the market. It identifies with the possibility that Baranak would need to pass on to its customers. Szwarc (2005, p. 89) takes note of that Baranka would put forth additional attempts in giving amusement to its clients. Breckenfeld (2008, p.34) characterizes outside parts of a brand as identifying with a similar that the customers see of Baranka’s administrations. The imperativeness of brands in day by day utilization identify with an ideal brand personality. Baranka ought to endeavor to moves its desires, on picture, to the clients. Singh (2007, p. 41) clarifies that it is crucial to take note of that such a brand would be useful over the long haul. Divide (2011, p. 23) says that regardless of the way that clients may have fanciful brand pictures, it is vital for Baranka to submit endeavors in accomplishing the ideal brand personality. Earthy colored (2006, p. 126) takes note of that it accomplishes the equivalent by utilizing advertising blend components. Showcasing blend components incorporate correspondence, item, cost and conveyance. The center piece of correspondence identifies with helpful promoting. Cochran (2003, p. 234) takes note of that Baranka ought to endeavor to recognize components that client s exceptionally esteem. For example, they would build a picture of accommodation to clients. In this point of view, Self and Roche (2012 p. 245) contends that the bistro would be proper for understudies and workers in their individual breaks. What's more, they would move their picture desires by bundling their sandwiches and loaves in an alluring manner. It is indispensable to take note of that there is huge rivalry in espresso bundling. In this manner, it is essential that Baranka astoundingly plans its refreshment tins. Dinnie (2007, p. 123) includes that another primary territory, of correspondence, relates to utilization of informal exchange in picking up exposure. Onkvisit and Shaw (2008, p. 278) includes that representatives are head

This academic paper seeks to compare and contrast Essays

This scholastic paper looks to thoroughly analyze Essays This scholastic paper tries to thoroughly analyze the presidential and parliamentary types of government and talk about how each type of advances liberal majority rules system in their three arms of government The primary contrast between a parliamentary and presidential arrangement of government is that in a presidential framework, the president is isolated from the authoritative body, yet in a parliamentary framework, the CEO, for example, an executive, is a piece of the administrative body, or parliament. A presidential framework isolates the official and authoritative elements of the administration and gives what are ordinarily called governing rules to restrain the intensity of both the CEO and the assembly. In a parliamentary framework, the lawmaking body holds the force, and the CEO must response to the assembly. Another primary contrast is that in a presidential framework, the CEO and individuals from the council are chosen independently by the individuals, however in a parliamentary framework, the governing body is chosen by the individuals and afterward should choose or suggest for arrangement one of its individuals to be the CEO. Numerous types of government are utilized by nations around the globe, and not very many governments are totally similar, regardless of whether they utilize a similar sort of framework. Presidential and parliamentary frameworks of government can change in explicit subtleties starting with one nation then onto the next, however certain general perspectives ordinarily are the equivalent in nations that have a similar kind of framework. For instance, in some parliamentary frameworks, the national administrative body is known as a parliament, and in others, it may be called by a term, for example, national get together, yet they by and large fill similar needs, paying little mind to their names. Moreover, the particular forces or obligations of presidents may shift from nation to nation, however they for the most part are totally chosen by the individuals and are isolated from the authoritative body. In a presidential framework, the president is the head of government and the head of state. As the head of government, the person directs the activities of the administration and satisfies certain obligations, for example, delegating authorities and consultants to help run the administration, marking or vetoing laws passed by the lawmaking body and setting up a yearly spending plan . A president's obligations as head of state incorporate assignments, for example, making addresses, speaking to the nation at open occasions, facilitating or visiting negotiators from different nations, and introducing lofty national honors. Then again, t he jobs of head of state and head of government frequently are held by various individuals in a parliamentary framework. For instance, a nation may have a PM who goes about as its head of government and a ruler who goes about as its head of state. A few nations that have a parliamentary framework additionally have a president rather than a ruler, who goes about as the head of state. A nation that has both a head administrator and a president is some of the time said to have a semi-presidential arrangement of government, despite the fact that it is all the more firmly identified with a parliamentary framework as a result of the force held by the assembly and leader in such a framework. Another contrast between these frameworks of government is the impacts that every framework has on things, for example, productivity and political bitterness. In a presidential framework, on the grounds that the CEO and individuals from the lawmaking body are chosen independently, it is feasible for the president to be from one ideological group and the council to be constrained by an alternate ideological group. This can cause conflict at the most significant levels of the legislature and make it hard for the official and the lawmakers to accomplish their particular objectives. In a parliamentary framework, the head administrator is quite often from the ideological group that controls the lawmaking body, so there is less strife, and it is simpler for that gathering to achieve its objectives. What's more, p arliamentary and presidential frameworks additionally vary in their capacities to expel the CEO from power. In a parliamentary framework, it is a lot simpler for the lawmaking body to evacuate the leader. Indeed, even a contradiction in strategy or an absence of compelling initiative could be sufficient explanation behind this to occur. A president is increasingly hard to expel from his

Essay on Readings in Humanities

Article on Readings in Humanities Article on Readings in Humanities Readings in Humanities The human condition envelops the one of a kind highlights of being human in both a social and individual setting. It is the reason we look for commendation and satisfaction. It is the purpose behind your interest, your inner voice and your judgment of others. It is independent from status, race, sex or social foundation. The human condition resembles that of no other living species on earth. It is the thing that makes us better than each other living creature. These essayists all will be all polarizing in their own privilege and every ha a remarkable view of the human condition. Sun Tzu is one of the most notable individuals in history as far as war. He was an evolutionist and a pioneer on the front line. Sun Tzu’s standards are still generally utilized and esteemed right up 'til today. A portion of the things he had faith in that I discovered especially intriguing while at the same time perusing â€Å"The Art of War†. Tzu safeguarded that his prosperity on the front line wasn’t essentially in light of prevalent weaponry. He knew the significance of key arranging and understanding your adversary. He had the option to analyze the qualities and shortcomings of his resistance and afterward plan in like manner to misuse those shortcomings on the front line. I think it’s amazing for somebody who lived such a long time ago in a very different world that we live in today to understand that war is so a lot, if not to a greater degree a mental battle as it is a physical one. He was one of the main actually mentally disapproved of commander s in the advanced world. One might say that his best weapon was his mind and that was a weapon that would remain exclusively in his ownership as long as he lived. Since Tzu is so definitely mindful how there are numerous sorts of shortcoming that can make us powerless, I wonder what type of government he thought as the best. Would it be with a solid dictator who seemed to have little shortcoming? Or on the other hand would his legislature be assorted and depict a level to untouchables? If Tzu somehow happened to govern would he attempt to vanquish others? I don’t figure I will ever know the responses to these inquiries yet if I somehow happened to converse with Tzu these future a portion of the things I’d ask him. Charles Manson to me is one of the most captivating people to ever live. I generally thought he was liable and ought to be in prison until he bites the dust however his interpretation of his â€Å"guilt† is fascinating. Manson kind of keeps up in his b ook the way that he, his physical self, didn't submit any killings so he shouldn’t be in prison for homicide. I feel that society is set up in the manner where individuals will consider others liable dependent on their own view of blame paying little mind to the manner in which the law is set up. Everybody in the public eye considered Manson to be a sociopath and a danger so they convict him and put remove him from society. He is viewed as an extreme untouchable thus we as people consider him to be somebody who is excessively immeasurably unique in relation to ourselves thus we discover approaches to expel them from every other person. He was somebody who individuals didn’t comprehend and that is the reason they were frightful of him. The mind larger part of individuals feel that murder isn't right so we rebuff the individuals who do it. Furthermore, most of individuals accept that the individuals who murder ought to be embarrassed and feel regretful. Furthermore, indi viduals like Manson don’t feel that we are stunned for reasons unknown however actually this conduct is in our inclination. Since the time the start of humanity we have been killing one another. A huge number of people through the span of time have killed each other. We as a race do this to one another and consistently have so I just don’t completely comprehend why we are amazed when individuals like Manson do the things that they do. I feel that there is a contention of ethics where Manson feels that since there is no blood on his hands that he isn’t blameworthy, however our general public accepts that he is as yet dependable. I feel that it’s something to be thankful for that our general public is set up along these lines to direct the activities of individuals like Manson since he is at last more hazardous than the normal individual. To be reasonable for Manson, he was somebody who in

Essay Topics Frequency - How to Use Your Knowledge For Essay Topics

Essay Topics Frequency - How to Use Your Knowledge For Essay TopicsThe California Bar Exam is probably the most intimidating exam a lawyer can have to take, and that's why it's important to know the best essay topics to write. You will have to write on a range of subjects from zoning to criminal law to real estate, and knowing the types of topics that are most frequently asked is helpful in preparing for your essay.Almost all the questions asked on the California Bar Exam are geared towards providing information that you will need to pass the test. There are two categories of information that you will be asked to provide. These are directly related to the legal profession, but there are a few specific areas where you may not be sure which section to write about.The first one is related to specific state laws, and the second one is all about the requirements you have to follow when choosing your client. There are a lot of topics that you will find, depending on the topic you select, w hich one should be the 'business topics' category. These are topics like real estate laws, financial policies, and zoning regulations.Another thing you should consider is the topic you choose for your essay topics. There are three things you need to consider when you write about these three areas. First, how can you make the topics of your own? Next, do you need to include references to different states in your essay or theses?Once you have done these two things, you will be able to easily choose essay topics to help you pass the test. The other thing you need to consider when writing essays for the California Bar Exam is the writing speed.Some of the essays you will be asked to write will be five minute paragraphs, so it is important that you use your best writing skills in order to effectively convey the information that you need to. If you fail to do this, you will end up missing the mark of clarity, and you will most likely fail the test, as no one will want to read a dumbo of a long essay.The other thing that you should consider is the amount of text in your article material. There are some topics that do not require any explanation at all, such as landlord and tenant laws, so it is important that you know how to properly write articles on topics that don't require any explanations. You will also be asked to write on a lot of different subjects, so it is important that you have something you know about to explain the topic.Knowing the frequency of essay topics is very important when you are preparing for the California Bar Exam. If you don't know what type of topics you will be asked to write about, you will be overwhelmed when you try to choose an essay topic for the exam. If you don't write about topics that you know well, you will be faced with the likelihood of failing the test.

Mcdonalds and the Environmental Defense Fund - Free Essay Example

McDonalds and the Environmental Defense Fund: a case study of a green alliance Sharon Livesey Originally published in†¦The Journal of Business Communication †¢ January 1999 In 1987, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, which had convened to address the global ecological crisis, produced Our Common Future (the Brundtland Report). This watershed event established the conceptual underpinnings for environmental politics and debate in the 1990s by reframing the problem of the natural environment as one of sustainable development. In the wake of this reframing, a new practice in environmental management emerged that of green alliances or partnerships between business and ecology groups (Westley Vredenburg, 1991, pp. 71-72). These alliances, considered one of the ten most significant trends in environmental management and the greening of industry (Gladwin, 1993, p. 46), appeared to signal a sea change in the way business, as well as environmentalists, could respond to the ecological impacts of firms economic activities. Indeed, environmental partnerships offered both business and ecology groups the potential for a new rhetorical stance. Business communication scholarship has identified a variety of rhetorical strategies adopted by corporations in the face of environmental controversy: defensiveness and apologia (e. g. , Ice, 1991; Tyler, 1992), competing information campaigns (e. g. , Lange, 1993; Moore, 1993), or retreat (e. g. , Seiter, 1995). Green alliances provide business with an alternative to these strategies. Through eco-partnership, a firm can adopt, at both material and symbolic levels, a proactive approach toward the natural environment; its posture vis-a-vis environmentalists, or at least a wing of the environmental movement, can be collaborative rather than conflictual. On the other hand, green alliances offer environmentalists the possibility of direct influence over business practice and an alternative to or as Fred Krupp, leader of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and an early proponent of eco-business collaboration, would have it, a tool in addition to the jeremiad (Killingsworth Palmer, 1996; Slovic, 1996). While eco-alliances have been discussed in the environmental management and green marketing literature, they have not been so far studied as business communication. This paper presents a case study of the rhetorical aspects of an early green partnership, the 1990-1991 precedent-setting alliance between McDonalds Corporation, the leading quick-service restaurant chain, and EDF, a United States-based mainstream environmental organization. McDonalds and EDF formed a joint task force that publicly released a six-month study of McDonalds entire range of packaging and materials management practices. The partnership is most widely known, however, for the fact that three months into the study, at the last minute, and under pressure from EDF, McDonalds abandoned the polystyrene boxes (called clamshells) it had traditionally used to package Big Macs and other sandwiches. This dramatic event tended to overshadow other arguably more important, and certainly less controversial work, including a 42-step action plan to lessen the environmental impacts of McDonalds business. My study seeks to recontextualize the packaging decision, considering it within the broader dynamics of the partnership and within the context of McDonalds prior corporate environmental advocacy. Further, it locates the McDonalds-EDF partnership within the broader realm of environmental politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s, an arena where nonprofit environmental groups began to play a new and important role. I focus on the symbolic and discursive aspects of the partnership. Relying on public relations material released by McDonalds and EDF before and during the partnership, as well as contemporaneous and subsequent news accounts, I show the variety and the variability of rhetorical strategies adopted by McDonalds in its attempt to construct itself as green in the eyes of its consumers and publics. I also explain the rhetorical approach used by EDF in its struggle to expand the scope of legitimate action by environmentalists to include collaboration with businesses. Green Partnerships: A New Kind of Alliance Alliances that have arisen between environmentalist groups and businesses in the last decade represent a shift in the arms-length, or adversarial, relationships among institutional stakeholders (business and environmentalists, environmentalists and government, government and business) traditionally concerned with problems of the natural environment (Long Arnold, 1995; Milne, Iyer, Gooding-Williams, 1996; Westley Vredenburg, 1991). The new relationships have been described as path breaking and innovative (e. . , Coddington, 1993; Long Arnold, 1995; Ottman, 1994; Wasik, 1996). Typically, they are distinguishable from the prior charitable (e. g. , donations to or sponsorships of environmental causes) and commercial relationships (e. g. , calendars, T-shirts produced for environmental groups) because they engage the expert knowledge of the environmental group and involve it, to varying degrees, in joint problem solving or strategic decision making with the corporate partner (Clair, M illiman, Mitroff, 1995). In this category are green product endorsements, audits by environmental groups of business programs or practices, and joint projects of the type engaged in by McDonalds and EDF, where the corporate partners business practices are evaluated and improved according to ecological criteria. The History of the McDonalds-EDF Partnership In 1989-1990, McDonalds was the leader of the fast-food industry, with worldwide operations employing approximately 500,000 people in 11,000 restaurants and serving 22 million customers a day. At the time EDF approached McDonalds, its entanglement in controversy over its packaging frustrated the company. From EDFs perspective, McDonalds leadership position, its problematic history of waste management, and the iconic value of waste management as an environmental issue made the company an attractive candidate for partnership. EDF saw significant opportunity for both environmental action and a major, high visibility, opportunity to test its innovative approach to environmental problem-solving through corporate partnerships. On the other hand, EDFs positioning as a mainstream environmental group made it an attractive ally. McDonalds earlier attempts to talk with the more radical Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste (CCHW), one of the ecology groups organizing grassroots actions against the company, had failed (Gifford, 1991). Below I briefly summarize the background histories of McDonalds and EDF before turning to a description of the partnership. McDonalds Environmental Record With environmentalism on the rise among the general public in the 1980s, consumer-driven businesses were particularly subject to and sensitive about public pressure (Livesey, 1993a, pp. 2-4). Plastic had been demonized by several environmentalist organizations including the grassroots groups Greenpeace and CCHW. The use-and-dispose philosophy at the core of McDonalds business and its distinctive plastic clamshell sandwich boxes, which helped to make the company one of the largest single users of polystyrene in the United States, had made McDonalds a continuing target of ecology groups (Livesey, 1993a, p. 4). Throughout the late 1980s, McDonalds instituted and publicized a number of environmentally positive steps in its domestic operations (see Figure 1). It reduced consumption, for instance, by using lighter weight paper in straws, paper bags and other items and recycled paper and cardboard packaging. In 1987, it switched from polystyrene (used for the clamshells) blown with CFCs, the family of chemicals which destroy the ozone layer, to plastic foam that used hydrocarbon blowing agents (Annual Report, 1989, pp. 10-15). In 1989, the company instituted a pilot program in 450 New England stores to recycle its plastic clamshells (Holusha, 1989; Livesey, 1993a, pp. 2-14). In April, 1990, it committed $100 million, or one quarter of the companys annual building and remodeling budget, to buy recycled materials for restaurant construction, remodeling, and operations under a program called McRecycle (Livesey, 1993a, pp. 13-14). In 1989 and 1990, McDonalds bolstered its environmental management practices with a proactive public relations campaign. The centerpiece was the 1989 Annual Report, which highlighted the issue of the natural environme nt. McDonalds also offered in-store flyers to educate customers about the companys environmental management practices, policies, philosophies, and positions on particular issues such as rainforest beef and the ozone problem. Brochures on environmental topics, including packaging, were available from its public relations department. In addition, McDonalds worked with several different environmental and nonprofit groups (e. g. , the World Wildlife Fund and the Smithsonian Institution) to coproduce elementary school materials on the environment. Despite its efforts, the company continued to be criticized. The Environmental Defense Fund Twenty years after being founded in 1967 as a grassroots group that litigated against the use of DDT on Long Island, EDF had become one of the Group of 10 mainstream U. S. organizations (Clair, Milliman, Mitroff, 1995, p. 168; Dowie, 1995). With a budget of close to $16 million (Reinhardt, 1992, p. 6), its staff had expanded to include 110 lawyers, economists, and scientists; membership was greater than 200,000 (Livesey, 1993a, p. 14) and a Harvard Business School graduate served as chairman of its board of trustees (Reinhardt, 1992, p. 6). The scientific culture of its early days gave EDF a basis for positioning itself as a technical expert. In the late 1980s, its Executive Director Fred Krupp (1986) began to propose coalitions of former enemies (p. 34), that is, coalitions with corporate America, as an important tool for achieving environmental change. EDF thus differentiated its role within the competitive environmental movement, a move for which it was criticized by CCHW and other more radical groups who said that EDF had become too close to corporate interests and too willing to compromise (Reinhardt, 1992, p. 5; see also Dowie, 1995, pp. 05-124). Before the McDonalds partnership, EDF had pursued various joint projects with organizations and groups ranging from the World Bank to the electric utility industry to western water users (Reinhardt, 1992, p. 4). Further, like McDonalds, EDF had participated in multi-party negotiations organized by the Coalition of Northeast Governors to develop waste management guidelines for New England. Thus, it had built expertise in the area of packaging and waste management and had enjoyed a working relationship with McDonalds representatives before the task force was initiated (EDF Fact Sheet, August 1, 1990). The McDonalds-EDF Alliance The task force history had three phases: the announcement of the McDonalds-EDF partnership on August 1, 1990; McDonalds decision to abandon its clamshell packaging on November 1, 1990; and the release of the joint task force study on April 16, 1991. A brief history of the partnership follows (see Figure 2). The McDonalds-EDF joint task force on waste reduction was the outcome of a year of EDF-initiated dialogue with the company (Reinhardt, 1992, p. 9). The eight-member group included representatives from McDonalds, EDF, and The Perseco Company, McDonalds exclusive packaging supplier. Shelby Yastrow, General Counsel and Senior Vice President of Environmental Affairs at McDonalds, along with EDF Executive Director Fred Krupp, oversaw the group (McDonalds Corporation EDF Press Release, August 1, 1990). The alliance was structured by a formal written agreement (McDonalds EDF Final Report, 1991, pp. 5-6) that defined the issues the task force was to consider and set up some ground rules. Designed to anticipate potential conflict, the agreement included an escape clause in case of disagreement, preserved the parties rights to note publicly their differences, provided for the parties financial independence, and permitted each organization to pursue its own public relations and advocacy agendas on the environment during the period of the task force. McDonalds, however, was barred from publicizing the task force in marketing materials without EDFs prior approval; EDF was not so restricted. McDonalds Yastrow and EDFs Krupp held a joint press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, to announce the Landmark Task Force (McDonalds Corporation EDF Press Release, August 1, 1990, p. 1). They promised a six-month study and public release of recommendations and results. McDonalds committed itself to following the recommendations where feasible (p. 1). On November 1, 1990, three months into the partnership, McDonalds made an 11th-hour decision under pressure from the EDF to discontinue its clamshell sandwich packaging. McDonalds prior plan to expand its New England plastic recycling program nationwide was abandoned. McDonalds decision received much positive press coverage. A January 1991 Advertising Age poll showed that McDonalds was perceived as more environmentally responsible than its competitors, though none of them were particularly highly rated (cited in Livesey, 1993b). At the same time, however, the decision was criticized by three groups: environmentalists who saw both paper and plastic as environmentally harmful (e. g. Beyea quoted in Holusha, 1990, p. D5); plastics and recycling proponents (e. g. , Rayport Lodge, 1990) who said that McDonalds had caved in to consumer pressure and done the wrong thing for the environment (p. B5); and segments of the business press who saw McDonalds 11th hour about-face as a cave in to EDFs strong-arming (Grimm, 1990, p. 4). The plastics industry mounted an intense pro-plastic advertising effort and advocacy campaign, but its efforts were described by the media as too little, too late (Ryan, 1990, p. C3). EDF justified the decision on scientific and economic grounds, responding to critics through various channels, including letters to the editor (Denison, 1990b), op-ed pieces (Denison, 1990c), and memoranda which it circulated to interested parties (Denison, 1990a, p. 1; see also Denison, Prince, Ruston, 1990). In April 1991, the McDonalds-EDF joint task force released its final product, a corporate waste reduction policy and a comprehensive waste reduction action plan with 42 initiatives. Many real environmental improvements were generated by the task force. For instance, environmental criteria were integrated into corporate packaging decisions which before had been driven by quality and cost criteria (see McDonalds Final Report, 1991). The media mostly praised the results of the alliance (see Reinhardt, 1992, p. 14), and the story was recycled over several years (e. g. , Management briefs, 1992; Gifford, 1991; Gutfeld, 1992). Ultimately, as I have described above, the partnership entered the green business literature as a milestone marking a change in the relationships between business and environmental groups (e. g. , Cairncross, 1995, pp. 81-182; diBenedetto Chandran, 1995, p. 272; Long Arnold, 1995, pp. 28-29; Lozada Mintu-Wimsatt, 1995, p. 181; Wasik, 1996, p. 28, pp. 71-74). Discussion and Analysis I analyze below McDonalds 1989 Annual Report; McDonalds Vice President of Environmental Affairs Yastrows and EDF Executive Director Krupps speeches announcing the partnership at the press conference on August 1, 1990; the announcement of the packaging switch on November 1, 1990 and its aftermath; and the public release of the Final Report of the joint task force. I then turn to a discussion of the case. McDonalds 1989 Annual Report McDonalds 1989 annual report represents an aggressive attempt by the company to manage the public discourse around the companys role as an environmentally responsible corporate citizen and construct itself as green. The report belongs to the category of epideictic advocacy (e. g. , the Mobil Oil campaign), the discourse of praise and blame that is commonly used to establish or consolidate value premises, especially in corporate issue management campaigns; such discourse often serves as a basis for later persuasive efforts (Cheney Vibbert, 1987, p. 83; Crable Vibbert, 1983). Epideictic rhetoric works by building on shared premises and borrowing from values and beliefs embedded in the common culture. In this case, given the new ecological awareness of the public, McDonalds positions itself as having concerns ecological and practical, social as well as economic. As described by the media, the 1989 Annual Report looks more like an Audubon Society brochure t han a financial statement (Horovitz, 1991, p. D2). Nature pictures, poetry, and quotations from national and international figures prominent in the environmental movement (e. g. , Gro Brundtland) are interspersed throughout the report, along with product and financial information. The cover contains a four-page foldout picture of the Northwest American forest with a quotation from Chief Seattle about mans proper relationship to the earth. The report itself is dedicated to a discussion of the [environmental] challenges which lie ahead (McDonalds Annual Report, 1989, p. 2). The discussion is contained in a 10-page supplement. The themes of dialogue, rational discourse, pragmatic solutions, the value of individual effort, and stewardship or shared social responsibility for the earth that are played out in the supplement are initially articulated in the shareholders letter: We believe the environmental challenges facing the world can be addressed and solved by working in partnership with people wherever we do business. . . . We believe each of us can make a difference. To do that we need to understand the issues, discuss the alternatives, and develop practical and economic solutions. Preserving and enhancing the integrity of our environment benefits everyone. Thats good for us and good for everyone that we do business with. We are concerned about the future of our children and the world we live in. We invite your careful reading and your comments. (p. 2) This letter is as notable for what it omits as for what it says. It at once implicates the reader, inviting dialogue, and yet leaves the situation ambiguous, particularly vis-a-vis the companys responsibility and intentions. What, for instance, will become of any reader comments? To whom should they be directed? How should a discussion on the environment be orchestrated? Indeed, who exactly is being invited into the dialogue? While McDonalds injects an appeal to rational discourse, in fact, the primary strategy here is to avoid hard issues through implied congruence between peoples (ours, the readers? ) and McDonalds values, beliefs, and hopes. Rational argument, however, might question whether the kind of difference McDonalds, a giant corporation, can make is equivalent to what other people can do. Further, in what specific ways will preserving the environment be good (or, what is left unstated, bad) for McDonalds as compared to other people? Here we see an example of what Cheney (1992) has referred to as the decentering of the individual in this case, the corporate persona through corporate rhetoric that complicate[s] matters of authorship, voice, attribution, and responsibility (p. 176) and de-emphasizes McDonalds role as a multinational company whose decisions and actions have immense impact on the environment and transcend and in many cases control those of millions of individual natural persons. The shareholders letter thus anticipates a key rhetorical strategy used in the environmental supplement to the report, to which I turn next. The supplement contains several distinct parts: an answer to a letter from Dan Getty, an 11-year-old boy who calls for responsible action from McDonalds (Annual Report, 1989, pp. 7-8); a general outline of McDonalds philosophy and historical commitment to responsible [environmental] conduct, including company founder Ray Krocs mandate to crews to clean up litter near McDonalds restaurants (p. 9); three sections addressing facts and expert opinions about solid waste management, resource conservation, and recycling (pp. 10-15); and a collective call to Help [sic] in solving the challenge of the environment (p. 6). The letter of response to 11-year-old Dan Getty illustrates several of the rhetorical strategies McDonalds uses to achieve a symbolic identification with its customers and the general public. First, McDonalds constructs itself as a naive, non-expert, and innocent individual actor. Like Dan Getty and people of all ages, McDonalds is asking questions about our environment and l earning that the answers to environmental issues are complex (Annual Report, 1989, p. 7). It eschews inaction in the face of complexity: Its easy for each of us to claim were not responsible for these complex forces. But then we have to ask, Who is? (p. 8). At the same time, it sounds a cautionary note: It is important to do what is environmentally sound, when the responsible course of action becomes clear (p. 7). Who or what will provide clarity leading to action is left ambiguous. Second, McDonalds positions itself as one of a community of stewards of the earth: Each of us, knowing what we have at stake, must make a commitment to a course of action that will preserve and enhance the environment we hold in trust for future generations. . . . You can count us in (p. 8). Through appeal to the words of Gala theory originator James Lovelock Its personal action that counts (quoted in McDonalds, 1989, p. 8) and founder Ray Krocs dictum None of us is as good as all of us (quoted in Annual Report, 1989, p. 8) the boys call for help from McDonalds is transformed into a call for everyone to act. The actions and identification that it invites are personal. Identifying with its customers, McDonalds asks that they identify with it. McDonalds puts itself on a level with the 11-year-old. Thus, through rhetorical sleight, of-hand in Cheneys (1992) words the sheer juxtaposition of images . . as a substitute for reasoned discourse, for argument (p. 174) McDonalds equates natural persons with the corporate persona, and power differences the differences between producer and consumer, corporate giant and small child are made to disappear: The people at McDonalds, no different from people everywhere, must act to save the earth. Of course, at one level, McDonalds people are like people everywhere and, like them, probably hold a range of opinions about the problem of the natural environment But at another level and at the same time, McDonalds people constitute a corporate body. The distinctions and tensions of this duality are ridden over in the corporate writing here. The next section of the annual report supplement tells a different story: that of McDonalds the corporate citizen who has relied on experts for sound advice. McDonalds defends its environmental record by listing specific actions that it has taken to manage waste and conserve resources by reducing, reusing and recycling materials. It cites experts who support its position on plastic packaging and who point out the small contribution of the entire quick-service restaurant industry to Americas waste. It also criticizes the Not In My Back Yard syndrome or NIMBY (for instance, people in McDonalds communities who opposed company incinerators in their neighborhoods) as posing barriers to responsible waste solutions (Annual Report, 1989, p. 11). While the story that is told attempts to validate McDonalds waste management practices, at the same time it implicitly places beyond the reach of criticism certain core values of McDonalds business, among them convenience (throw-away) and low-cost mass consumerism. Within the frame it creates, broader resource issues related to consumption cannot be raised. The problem of the environment is conceptualized narrowly as one that can be managed through appropriate technology and good habits, like keeping the sidewalk clean, concepts that fit well with American individualistic beliefs about how problems can best be addressed. In the closing section of the report, McDonalds again emphasizes individual personal action: Plant a tree, switch off a light, recycle a clamshell. Yet, it also describes itself as a proactive corporate actor look[ing] for opportunities to work with individuals, public officials, and other companies, as well as with the communities we serve. What is also uncertain here is whether McDonalds is a proactive leader or reactive follower. This ambiguity is better understood by considering the annual report in the context of external political pressures on the company at the time (Deetz Kersten, 1983). Throughout the middle and late 1980s McDonalds faced threats of local laws and litigation restricting use of plastic packaging, picketing of its stores, and other grassroots actions. CCHW, one of the groups opposing McDonalds, had launched a Ronald McToxic campaign, effectively appropriating (or, in McDonalds terms, misappropriating) the company mascot, the clown Ronald McDonald, to make him an emblem of betrayal and doom. CCHW thus subverted the companys fun-and-friendly image, a tactic that enraged the company. CCHW and other radical groups organized a childrens campaign to mail used clamshells to McDonalds headquarters, thus quite effectively politicizing children. Finally, the packaging issue stole the focus from the product food and kept it instead on the box. Although the annual report rhetorically constructs McDonalds as ready to collaborate, in practical and political terms, the company had already assumed a posture of opposition and conflict. Its responses were essentially ad hoc, reactive, and defensive a classic pattern under the command-and-control paradigm. From this perspective, we can see the annual report as McDonalds attempt to achieve symbolically what was elusive in fact. Through language, it seeks to reclaim control, depoliticizing environmental issues by reconstituting them as personal and part of a universal goal to do the right thing for the environment. It offers individual action as a counter to political action: Empowerment is achieved by turning off a light, planting a tree. Furthermore, McDonalds goal of preserving and enhancing the integrity of the environment because it benefits everyone (Annual Report, 1989, p. 2) has to be distinguished from the win-win rhetoric of market-based environmentalism. The general bene fit of a healthy environment is not the same as specific economic advantages, such as cost savings from reduced use of materials or increased sales, which are benefits derived from environmental management programs. Indeed, at the same time that McDonalds was carrying out environmental initiatives, its spokespersons were claiming that market research results showed no effect on McDonalds customers behaviors resulting from environmental awareness (Yastrow, August 1, 1990, Press Conference). This is not the discourse of market-based environmentalism, but rather the older model where the corporation faces (and resists) restrictive legislation, and its environmental efforts fall under the rubric of general good citizenship and corporate social responsibility. We can nevertheless view McDonalds from a different perspective at this juncture. Following Weick (1979), we can see that businesses, as well as other institutional actors, enacting the environments in which they participate are both subjects and objects of their own perceptions (Weick, 1979, p. 165): Eventually they stumble over their own enactments (p. 167). This is especially true of large organizations. The more McDonalds constituted itself as green, the more it was required to accommodate environmental issues affected by its business practices. McDonalds attempts at recycling, resource reduction, incineration, and the like were not simply symbolic. The company was both the subject and the object of its own eco-discourse. The emerging storyline it constructed had positive environmental effects at the material level, in addition to opening the company to potential dialogue with EDF. Announcement of the EDF Partnership Krupp and Yastrow made prepared statements at the August 1990 press conference announcing the McDonalds-EDF partnership. Their speeches were followed by a question-and answer session with the press. The different rhetorical positioning of the partners shows key differences in the ways they chose to construct themselves publicly. Krupp opens the press conference. In contrast to McDonalds strategy in the letter to Dan Getty, where responsibility for the environment is equally distributed and personally focused, Krupp distinguishes between corporate and individual action (although he also includes individuals within his mandate to change). His speech begins by scolding: America is the worlds trash king . . . McDonalds is part of the problem. He sets EDF up as morally superior: EDF is committed to changing these wasteful ways. America can no longer be a throwaway society . . . Were determined to see McDonalds make fundamental changes in the way they [sic] operate. Were determined to see the restaurant industry, industry in general, and each of us as individuals make fundamental changes in the way we operate (McDonalds EDF, August 1, 1990). Krupp also puts EDF on the moral high grou nd and takes credit for EDFs leadership role in initiating this relationship. It is not clear when he says we (Were not just talking about fundamental changes in the way one corporation does business, were talking about substantially reducing the amount of trash 22 million people throw away every day) whether the rhetorical community to which he is referring is EDF and McDonalds, or EDF and the American public; or perhaps, he is simply speaking for EDF itself. This rhetoric, a mild form of the jeremiad, is typical of earlier environmentalists (Slovic, 1996). It was a style probably personally familiar to Krupp, himself a product of the 1970s. In other venues, however, when reflecting on the practice of market environmentalism, Krupp and others of EDF (e. g. , Golfman quoted in Coddington, 1993) specifically abjure preaching (p. 186). As they appear to recognize, it is not the ethos of the scientists/consensus builders of market environmentalism of the 1980s (see Killingsworth Palmer, 1996, pp. 34-35). Curiously, here where Krupp is initiating a collaboration, he chooses rhetoric more associated with the old conflictual mode. McDonalds role as corporate leader, however, is the source for praise as well as blame; Krupp uses it as the pivotal point in his speech: McDonalds can help because they are a leader. They are number one in their business. . . . Its time to turn the golden arches green. The message here is that McDonalds can reform (that is, EDF will reform it); it can transform itself from restaurant industry leader to environmental leader, again something very different from anything that an 11-year-old Dan Getty or any individual can achieve. After taking the moral high ground, Krupp turns to a theme of collaboration: Youve got a waste problem. Together lets solve it. At this point, Krupp uses the language of the confident expert, talking about solution and innovation, technological cures for the environment: This is the discourse of market environmentalism. However, we hear, still, a contrapuntal voice: EDF will not accept a dime from McDonalds. . . . We will continue to vigorously litigate on solid waste issues all around the country. In fact, were always ready to roll out the heavy artillery. But there are also moments in time when even powerful opponents should sit down and talk. Krupp not only stresses EDFs financial independence (an issue that had troubled other green alliances such as the one between Pollution Probe and Loblaws), but also appeals to images of conflict and war. Krupp repeats this heavy artillery image in the question-and-answer period, when he reasserts EDFs right to disagree with McDonalds over substantive issues. In the same context, he talks about EDF putting its recommendations out in the sunshine, and [letting] all of you know what they are. . . Theres power in the court of public opinion. Thus, while the desire is for dialogue and partnership, it is backed up by not-so-veiled threats of conflict, litigation, and public controversy. Here, as in The Wall Street Journal op-ed piece, where he talked about the market-based approach, Krupp (1986) leaves room for the counter-discourse and the practices of radical 1970s environmentalism. In the opening line of his speech at the press conference, Yastrows rejoinder to Krupps rhetorical turn shows his resistance to Krupps repositioning of the McDonalds image: Green arches indeed . . thats why Fred will never make it in marketing (McDonalds, August 1, 1990). Using humor, he resists Krupps effort to displace the golden (commercial) with the green (environmental) identity. He restates McDonalds goal as one that recognizes balance between business and environmental objectives: Were very serious about this thing, were very serious about the environment, were very serious about making this work, were very serious about our shareholders. Yastrow recognizes the difference of perspective (he called McDonalds and EDF the odd couple), but he minimizes difference by generalizing the goal as everyone want[ing] this to be a better place. The use of we is clearly intended to close social and political gaps. Yastrows language exhibits some of the decentering strategies noted above in the annual r eport, employing, for instance, the mysterious we as in, We all want the same thing. Nevertheless there are differences. Here, as compared to the annual report, the we can be realized at both symbolic and material levels through partnership with EDF. A real forum for dialogue has been created, although whether that forum is a democratic or not can be argued (see Hajer, 1995). Transparency and openness are critical features in market environmentalism. Although, like Krupp, Yastrow responds to the need for public accountability, his tone is altogether different. Krupps metaphors refer to exposure: he talks about sunshine (analogous to sunshine laws which give the public access to governmental decision making) and the court of public opinion. Yastrow, however, makes the voluntary gesture; he points to the EDF partnership as [something] youll [the press] be able to see for yourselves whether we can meet [the challenge]. We put our money where our mouth is. He says that McDonalds, under fire, does not go into hiding but . . . into a fish bowl; McDonalds doors and drawers are opened to EDF. McDonalds is open also, in the figurative sense, to listening and learning. Yastrows metaphors are aimed at trust-building which is directed towar d the public through EDF and the media. Yastrow expresses optimism about cooperative action, saying, It seems that this is working already. He talks about feelings, as well as expertise; in contrast to Krupps moralism, he appeals to sentiment: Were all, at least over at McDonalds, were very excited about it. He also appears to borrow readily from the discourse of market environmentalism when he talks about McDonalds becoming a laboratory for scientific experiment, while at the same time hoping that McDonalds can teach the scientists something about running a business. Yastrow thus explicitly disavows the old ways. Faced with disagreement, he says there will be no duels. Unlike Krupp, he rejects the conflict scenario; instead, he posits rational discourse as McDonalds weapon of choice: If I cant convince Fred Krupp or Richard Denison that we should not use Wedgwood china, then I wont be able to convince the American public, or you [the press], and then I better use it. Persuasion will be the tool, and collaboration the mode, of this relationship. In summary, Yastrow talks, for the most part, in the language of market environmentalism, laced with a bit of sentimentalism, while Krupps public entry into the new relationship with McDonalds borrows more evenly from both old and new discourses. He is both scold and scientist/expert/innovator; he is a collaborator who holds heavy artillery in the wings. The difference between Yastrow and Krupp reflects the differences in their rhetorical goals: McDonalds must achieve credibility by transforming itself. EDF, on the other hand, has to keep its credibility with its original constituents by maintaining its identity as a public interest group while brokering a new identity with the corporate world. At the early stage in their relationship, the symbolic convergence (Borman, 1983) between the EDFs and McDonalds stories is strained. Packaging Switch In late October 1990, EDFs earlier, merely rhetorical threat of conflict and public exposure was put to the test when McDonalds, without consulting the joint task force, decided to extend its plastic clamshell recycling program nationwide (Holusha, 1990, p. A1). Even less than a month earlier, the New England recycling program had been extended to Los Angeles with much fanfare. We can speculate that supplier relationships, issues of quality, and perhaps also a conviction by some inside the company that its year-and-a-half-old recycling program was environmentally good were behind the pro-clamshell factions desire to keep the polystyrene packaging. Krupp nevertheless called on CEO Rensi to consider an alternative proposal from the task force and threatened to oppose McDonalds publicly if it went ahead with its decision. According to the public record (Gifford, 1991; Greening of golden arch, 1990; Holusha, 1990), there was disagreement inside McDonalds about the decision. CCHW and a large number of environmental groups that had crusaded against plastic were on EDFs side. However, as mentioned above, the decision created controversy and drew negative reaction from some quarters. Because of the internal controversy at McDonalds, EDF appears to have somewhat lost control over the communication strategy for announcing the packaging switch and did not have time to prepare to deal with the backlash in the press. Most importantly for the point here, however, is that EDF was prepared to oppose McDonalds and contemplate a disruption in the relationship that is, it was prepared to act publicly in the old oppositional mode to force an outcome that it believed was right in terms of the natural environment. At the same time, EDF talked in the language of the new environmentalism; Krupp positions McDonalds action as an environmental touchdown and the beginning of a new era of environmental problem solving (quoted in Livesey, 1993b, p. 103). McDonalds did not, however, take on the role of proactive environmental leader. The company backed away from a high-profile joint press conference with EDF, instead releasing a separate press statement and conducting, jointly with EDF, one-on-one interviews with selected members of the press. More importantly, the company refused to endorse the environmental merits of its new sandwich packaging over the old clamshells. In a public statement about the matter, McDonalds CEO Rensi said, Although some scientific studies indicate that foam packaging is environmentally sound, our customers just dont feel good about it (quoted in Livesey, 1993b, p. 103). By retreating from its position as environmental innovator to its more comfortable role of business marketer, McDonalds could save face with its suppliers, many of whose businesses we can assume were seriously affected by the packaging change, as well as with those inside McDonalds who may have been committed to the clamshell recycling programs they had been asked to implement in New England and Los Angeles. At this critical juncture in the relationship, McDonalds publicly constructed itself not as green but as customer-centered. This was a public relations loss for EDF. Task Force Study and Action Plan The press release (McDonalds Corporation EDF Press Release, April 16, 1991) announcing the publication of the task force study positions it as one of the most comprehensive solid waste reduction plans ever developed and calls the partnership unprecedented (p. 1). In the press release, Richard Denison, a senior EDF scientist on the task force, asserts that McDonalds has demonstrated genuine commitment to the environment through its willingness to elevate waste reduction considerations to the same level as other company fundamentals like cleanliness and quick service [part of Krocs original operations riteria] (p. 2). In the same press release (April 16, 1991), McDonalds spokesperson Keith Magnuson says that the task forces accomplishments included action, not just the recommendations and options as originally envisioned. Magnuson claims, We want to do the right thing for the environment. . . . The changes that our customers will see-as well as those behind the counter will have a po sitive and long-lasting effect on the environment (p. 2). The announcement of the task force results appears to provide a moment of convergence in the relationship between McDonalds and EDF; they had come to speak the same language. The version of the partnership played in the popular press at almost the same time, however, is of EDF as a David to McDonalds Goliath. People magazine, for instance, featured an article on the McDonalds-EDF alliance (Reed, 1991) showing a picture of a tiny Fred Krupp atop a giant clamshell. Later, Rolling Stone (Gifford, 1991) and The Economist (Management briefs, August 29, 1992) ran detailed stories about the EDF-McDonalds partnership, foregrounding the story of the overthrow of the clamshell. Although we have to take account the way in which news values and the media predilection for drama and conflict distort environmental messages, the clamshell story nevertheless provided EDF with a way to enter the public imagination as heroic defender of the environment, an image appropriate to the old paradigm. EDF could also thus continue to ride the anti-plastic sentiment that had been whipped up by large numbers of environmentalists. duels. What function does EDFs talk of conflict serve at the beginning of the collaboration? How does the press image of EDF as victor serve the ecology group? Why did McDonalds retreat to a customer-centered rationale when it dropped the clamshell, even as EDF tried to position it as an environmental leader? I argue here that market environmentalism does not simply overwrite the discursive field. Rather, the counter and subordinate discourses serve necessary functions within the partnership, as described below. Identity Management and Discursive Struggle Following the theory of Weick (1979), Cheney and Vibbert (1987) see public discourse as the means whereby an organization makes and remakes itself, thus situating itself within particular domains; by shaping the discourse within its external environment, the organization shapes that environment itself (pp. 179-80). In this sense, at least, corporate public discourse can be understood as strategic management (Smircich Stubbart, 1985). Cheney and Vibbert (1987) point out that corporate public discourse serves three interrelated functions in this respect: (a) it has the rhetorical end of establishing general value premises that can be used for later more specific claims; (b) it serves the organization in its attempt to be an eminence grise in public policy debate, that is, to influence the debate without being labeled as a political actor; and (c) it helps the corporation to manage identity the question of what the organization is or stands for or wants to be' (Cheney Christensen, in press). More recently, particularly in respect to this third dimension of identity, public discourse has come to be seen as also having an internal function: it helps the organization to identify itself to itself (Cheney Christensen, in press). As Cheney and Christensen point out, an organization, through a reflexive process, seeks both to influence its external audiences and to take them as an ideal reference point by which to confirm its merits and good intentions (through marketing and opinion polls and the like). Where issue management is involved, as in this case, issue and identity thus become very much entwined. Organizations, however, operate with other actors in settings that are socially constructed (Aldrich, 1979; Smircich Stubbart, 1985; Weick, 1979) and are thus subject to discursive struggle. The ecological crisis represents a domain of discourse struggle in the 1990s in which the parties to the green alliance here were implicated. In this case, McDonalds was struggling with other business corporations, environmentalist groups such as EDF, Greenpeace, and CCHW, and public policy bureaucrats over the way in which corporations were to be socially and politically positioned as actors engaged in the problem of the natural environment. More specifically, McDonalds fought to control the representation and perception of its packaging policies and their impact on the earth. Similarly, EDF, along with other mainstream ecology groups, sought to claim legitimacy for a new kind of action by environmentalists. And, both sides sought to present themselves as reasonable and progressive to a public for whom environmental issues had become salient. In terms of identity management, McDonalds needed to escape the negative image that resulted from two interrelated issues: (a) the demonization of its plastic clamshell packaging by groups within the environmental movement; and (b) its symbolic embodiment of values (use-and-throw-away consumption) that were antithetical to ceo-awareness. The 1989 Annum Report sought to achieve this goal within the conventions of corporate public advocacy. As a kind of report card on the companys own activities, it functioned as a metatext (Cheney Christensen, in press) by its very existence attesting to the seriousness of McDonalds environmental effort. But McDonalds faced a major stumbling block: because there was no infrastructure to support recycling of the clamshells in any real way, there was a critical gap between its advocacy and its practice. At the symbolic level, McDonalds saw partnership with EDF as a good way to close this gap. Closing the gap by forming the partnership with EDF, however, had the potential to draw McDonalds into a political arena, an area that corporate issue management is designed to avoid and a setting where EDF was clearly more practiced and more confident about asserting control. In fact, McDonalds management publicly positioned the company as apolitical. As CEO Rensi, was quoted as saying, I cant solve nuclear war, but I can run a hell of a restaurant (Livesey, 1993a). McDonalds had a tricky task: it had to be of the partnership but not swallowed by it. It had to walk the boundary of the political world of environmental politics, allowing EDF to act as its surrogate, but not its subjugator. That struggle is played out in the announcement of the partnership in the banter between Yastrow and Krupp, described above, about turning the golden arches green and in the packaging switch. Compromise, not conversion, is what McDonalds sought, was the companys motive in selecting EDF as partner, and was what they ultimately got, the rhetorical skirmish over green and gold and the actual skirmish over the clamshell packaging notwithstanding. As Yastrow later reported, I knew they wouldnt try to talk us into doing something if it was economically unreasonable. Fred [Krupp] wouldnt come in and ask us to go to Wedgwood china. (Gutfeld, 1992). Nevertheless, when McDonalds came too close to being subjugated in the clamshell packaging face-off, it retreated from the environmental field. Taking cover in its old and familiar identity of marketer, it rationalized its decision as doing what its customers feel good about (Rensi quoted in Livesey, 1993b, p. 103). EDF, on the other hand, wanted to establish a niche for itself within the very competitive environmental movement. Proof of success, highly publicized, was its primary tool for building membership and economic (foundation) support. Moreover, a primary goal within the partnership was to expand the notion of what constituted an environmental success to include ecology groups working with business to produce change in corporate environmental practices. By its association with McDonalds, however, EDFs historic watchdog role, which is rooted in notions of the independence of non-profit environmental groups from business and government interests, was implicitly threatened (Milne, Iyer, Gooding-Williams, 1996). The partnership brought with it the tension between symbol and substance that has shadowed the entire historical relationship between business and the environment, a history where small gestures have routinely been presented as transformational events, where basic questions about consumption are swept under the carpet, and where big business has been perceived as exploiting environmental concern in order to make money (e. g. Coddington, 1993, pp. 201-205; Ottman, 1994, pp. 5357). EDF had to defend itself against claims of selling out to corporate interests (see Clair, Milliman, Mitroff, 1995, p. 77). Critical to its task therefore was maintaining its political advocacy role, the aspect that makes environmental groups most threatening to business. Without such a positioning, EDF could be seen as nothing more than environmental consultants to business, a position it explicitly rejected (Reinhardt, 1992). Furthermore, it would put at risk the very credibility that was of symbolic value to its corporate partner, and thus a key purpose of the partnership. EDF and McDonalds approached the partnership with organizational goals that were overlapping yet in tension. The public alliance between these two organizations was risky insofar as it pushed each across boundaries where it was difficult for it to comfortably reside. While attempting to construct identities that borrowed from the new paradigm of market-based environmentalism, the partners also needed to remain recognizable to themselves and their constituents. These factors help to account for the ambivalence heard in the rhetoric surrounding this relationship, and they explain the partners needs to draw on both old and new discourses of environmentalism. Finally, we need to see this green alliance in the larger context of the discourse struggle around the natural environment. The storyline of sustainable development is marked by an astonishing collection of claims and concerns brought together by a great variety of actors (Hajer, 1995, p. 1; see also Anderson, 1997). Within five years of the Brundtland report over 40 working definitions of the term sustainable development had emerged (Hajer, 1995, p. 1). Eco-business alliances are one sort of practice inhabiting the discursive field; they help to legitimate a particular concept and practice of sustainability, market-based environmentalism, but they cannot resolve the conflict on this contested terrain. Market-based environmentalism finds its necessary foil in command-and-control environmentalism; it is part of what helps to maintain the sustainable aspect of sustainable development. Thus the partnership drew into itself the contradictions, conflicts, and tumultuousness found within the discursive field, giving rise to the rhetorical ambivalence displayed within the McDonalds-EDF alliance. Conclusion and Future Research Notwithstanding Bullis (1997) recent criticism of a social constructionist approach toward the natural environment, given the important symbolic functions of green alliances and their role in the evolving discourse struggle around the problem of the natural environment, I believe that a social constructionist perspective will contribute to a critical understanding from a business communication perspective of this important new phenomenon-green alliances. I have sought to open this theoretical avenue by analyzing the rhetorical dynamics of one specific partnership viewed through the lens of discourses of command-and-control and market-based environmentalism. I thus hope to illuminate, at the level of a particular relationship, the complexities and paradoxes, contradictions and fragmentariness of the discursive struggle around the natural environment and to demonstrate how the actors in that struggle are both constrained by, and constitutive of, the struggle itself. To begin with, the partnership agreement between McDonalds and EDF limited the debate; that is, the issues of fast-food convenience and the environmental harms caused by a commodity culture were clearly beyond the scope of the alliance. Thus, the partnership was by its nature a compromise. Paradoxically, the clamshell decision, which appeared to threaten the partnership and opened EDF to a debate in the press between expert and counter-expert over whether McDonalds decision was a win for the environment as EDF claimed, also provided a cover for compromise and collaboration. Winning on the plastic issue proved that EDF would stay aligned with a large section of the environmental movement. It thus gave EDF room to compromise on the larger issue, as well on issues specifically for consideration within the partnership (e. g. , reusable service ware for in-store customers). For McDonalds part, capitulating on the recycling issue meant that it would not rupture the relationship with EDF. Thus it could continue to borrow its surrogate claim to legitimacy. The point here, however, is not to say whether the McDonalds-EDF partnership succeeded or failed. That story can be (and has been) told from friendly and critical perspectives. Here I wish rather to demonstrate the complex way in which the partnership played itself out. What I have analyzed here is the intertextuality of McDonalds and EDFs two stories, and of those created by and with other players jostling for control in the discursive struggle around the environment as it played out in the late 1980s through the 1990s. We have seen that neither party freely, unequivocally, and unambivalently moved into the new story of market based environmentalism in the way that much of green business literature suggests. These new alliances have moments of conflict. Indeed, the kind of market environmentalism they enact appears to be integrally tied to the old paradigm of command-and-control, with its panoply of strategies including regulatory control, litigation, and other heavy artillery (Krupp, Press Conference, August 1, 1990). Tensions between goals and interests keep the old story embedded in the new, where it serves needs for particular identity constructions at different moments and for particular constituents. In the story of green alliances, for instance, the prince must stay in some ways a frog because a transformative kiss from business would be the kiss of death for the environmental group and, indeed, for the legitimating aspect of the green partnership for business itself. Similarly, McDonalds cannot turn its golden arches green. I contrast this position with the opposite view expressed in green business literature that suggests a simple and unproblematic evolution from resistance (the old paradigm) to collaboration, win-win rhetoric and voluntarist solutions (the new paradigm), an approach that has been challenged from several quarters (e. . , Dowie, 1995; Levy, 1997; Newton Harte, 1997; Perspectives, 1994; Walley Whitehead, 1994). What I argue for here is a more complex understanding of green alliances that presents a picture of the dynamics of discursive struggle around the environment in which partnerships play a salient role. Future research needs to examine more recent allian ces between business and environmental groups. This task requires contemporaneous research to capture the language of partnership, a difficult prospect. Not only are there considerations of time, but access is especially difficult to attain since the parties are inclined to protect these new forms of collaboration from the scrutiny of outsiders. Indeed, Krupp has explicitly said (1995) that EDFs early experience had taught that partners should not talk to the press or others (p. 10). This research also demonstrates the need for inside accounts of green alliances. Without a picture from the inside of how the McDonalds-EDF relationship unfolded, several important questions are left tantalizingly unanswered. Broadly, these questions concern (1) How the parties to green alliances experience discursive differences; (2) Whether the joint project is ghettoized within either of the sponsoring organizations, and how the partners provide for internal communication between the task force and the home-base organizations; (3) How the partners coordinate communication with other stakeholders, especially in the case of McDonalds with its suppliers and, in the case of EDF, with other environmentalist groups; (4) How the parties themselves view the role of corporate public discourse; and (5) How these partnerships contribute to, or strain, identity building within the partnering organizations. All of these issues would better illuminate the delicate process of constructing green alliances and provide valuable lessons for those who attempt in the future to build such partnerships and for the researchers who attempt to understand them. NOTES 1. Market-based environmentalism (Hartman Stafford, 1997, p. 185 and sources cited in note 2) is also referred to by environmentalists as third wave environmentalism. EDFs Krupp (1986), one of its proponents, outlined three stages or waves of the environmental movement. The first stage, conservation, arose at the end of the 19th century; the second stage arose in the 1970s and is marked by the publication of Rachel Carsons Silent Spring (1962) and the founding of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. The third wave is the stage called market-based environmentalism. 2. The author recognizes that command-and-control legislation can be perceived as having beneficial effects in some business situations (e. g. , protecting market leaders) and that not all market mechanisms are welcomed by business, particularly if they can be perceived as sin taxes. The author thanks David Levy and Jan Beyea for these insights. 3. 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